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Abstract:   Debtors seeking to file bankruptcy may do so under either Chapter 
7 or Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. In either case, the bankruptcy system must 
determine what expenses will be allowed for the debtor in bankruptcy, including for 
substances such as food, drugs, and cigarettes. This paper examines the treatment of 
these  three  substances  by  the  Bankruptcy  Code  and  judges,  based  on  the  three 
standards  that  appear  in  the  Code:  (1)  what  is  allowed  by  the  IRS  National 
Standards, (2) what would constitute “abuse” of the system, and (3) what expenses 
are “reasonably necessary.” We then discuss five adverse effects that result from 
these provisions, including horizontal inequities between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, 
unfair  geographical  variations,  vertical  inequities  between  wealthier  and  poorer 
debtors, inconsistent judicial application of the rules, and inconsistency between the 
bankruptcy regime and other federal agencies and priorities. Bramson  ii 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF CHAPTERS 7 AND 13 
OF THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY CODE 
 
  In any capitalist society that allows for the accumulation of wealth by the “winners,” 
provisions must also be available to insulate the “losers” from the eternal trappings of debt.
1 
Such  refuge  is  available  in  Chapters  7  and  13  of  the  United  States  Bankruptcy  Code  (“the 
Code”), Title 11 U.S.C., which seeks both to offer a new start to struggling consumer debtors 
and equitably to distribute assets and income streams among debtors and creditors. 
  Part I of this paper offers a discussion of Chapters 7 and 13. Part II is an examination of 
how the Code treats three substances: food, drugs, and cigarettes. In Part III, this paper explores 
five adverse and unintended consequences of the substance rules, including horizontal inequities 
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, unfair geographical variations, vertical inequities between 
wealthier and poorer debtors, inconsistent judicial application of the rules, and inconsistency 
between the bankruptcy regime and other federal agencies and priorities. Part IV concludes. 
A. CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY 
  1. Function and Administration:  Chapter 7, also known as liquidation bankruptcy, allows 
a court-appointed trustee to take control of and liquidate all of a debtor’s non-exempt assets, 
using the proceeds to pay secured creditors, and then to reimburse unsecured creditors at a pro 
rata share from any remaining funds.
2 The debtor then receives an immediate discharge from all 
debts
3 and is free to reenter society with a fresh start. 
  2.  Threshold  Eligibility:    Until  recently,  Chapter  7  bankruptcy  was  available  to  all 
debtors,  barring  a  finding  by  the  supervising  court  that  granting  the  petition  would  be  a 
“substantial  abuse”  of  the  system.  In  2005,  however,  President  Bush  signed  into  law  the 
                                                 
1 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 143 (6th ed. 2009). 
2 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2010). 
3 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2010). Bramson  2 
 
Bankruptcy  Abuse  Prevention  and  Consumer  Protection  Act  (BAPCPA),  which  drastically 
altered this standard in an attempt to curb what the administration saw as rampant abuse by 
individuals who could afford to pay more to their creditors but were looking for a quick and easy 
way to clear their debts.
4 Most scholars have rejected this explanation, noting that nearly all 
bankruptcies are attributable to forces beyond the control of the debtor,
5 and that the motivations 
behind BAPCPA’s enactment were built on “mean-spiritedness” and “intellectual dishonesty.”
6 
It is also believed to have added unnecessary complexity to an already difficult statute.
7 
  3. Below-Median Debtors:  The legal standard for Chapter 7 eligibility now depends on 
whether the debtors’ income (for their household size) falls above or below the median income 
in their state of residency.
8 For below-median debtors, Chapter 7 is available unless the court 
finds such relief would be “abuse” of the system—a more restrictive version of the pre-BAPCPA 
“substantial abuse” test.
9 It is unclear that this shift is meaningful in a practical sense, however, 
as judges have used similar judicial discretion under both standards. Indeed, not a single case 
under the old standard had allowed bankruptcy to progress after a finding that such relief would 
be an “abuse” of the system but not “substantial abuse.”
10 
  4. Above-Median Debtors:  For wealthier debtors, the Code now features a complicated 
eligibility  test,  failure  of  which  pushes  debtors  either  into  Chapter  13  or  out  of  bankruptcy 
entirely. This new requirement, codified in § 707(b)(2) and commonly known as the “means 
                                                 
4 See generally Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485 (2005). 
5 Ninety percent of all consumer bankruptcies are the direct result of “job difficulties, medical problems, and family 
breakups.” WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 114. 
6 Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191 (2005). 
7 See, e.g., id. at 191-93. 
8 In 2009, the national median income was $49,777, with a range of $35,078 (MS) to $64,851 (CT). U.S. Census 
Bureau, State Median Income, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/statemedian/index.html. 
9 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010). 
10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 707.04 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). Bramson  3 
 
test,” creates a presumption of abuse (and therefore ineligibility) if the debtor’s current monthly 
income, less certain expenditures, exceeds statutory limits. These allowed expenditure amounts 
are specified in detail, and include payments for mortgages, cars, children’s tuitions, and some 
other  expenses.
11  The  determination  of  certain  other  costs,  however,  was  administratively 
delegated  to  the  IRS,  which  publishes  National  Standards  and  Local  Standards  for  allowed 
expenditures of food, out-of-pocket health care, and other categories.
12 
The IRS’s numbers were derived from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Consumer 
Expenditure  (CE)  Survey,  which  tracks  actual  expenditures.
13  Accordingly,  they  were  not 
promulgated pursuant to any administrative determination of the amounts appropriate for debtors 
in bankruptcy. Moreover, the IRS chose to use the BLS’s numbers for the Service’s own tax 
purposes, not with an eye toward their use in bankruptcy. Predictably, the National Standards’ 
importation into the bankruptcy context has led to unintended consequences. 
B. CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY 
 
  1.  Function  and  Administration:    Debtors  seeking  relief  through  Chapter  13  of  the 
Bankruptcy Code keep possession of their assets, instead paying creditors a portion of their debts 
over a span of three to five years.
14 In order to qualify, the debtor proposes a detailed budget 
using IRS Schedules I and J. If the creditors approve the budget, or if the plan provides for them 
to receive the entire disposable income of the debtor, the court shall confirm it for execution.
15 
At the end of the plan’s duration, a successful debtor receives a discharge from his debts.
16 
However, this is no small feat: tight budgets, lack of flexibility, and harsh consequences for even 
                                                 
11 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010). 
12 Other items include clothing, housekeeping supplies, housing, and personal care. IRS.gov, National Standards: 
Food, Clothing and Other Items, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104627,00.html. 
13 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, http://www.bls.gov/cex/. 
14 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2010). 
15 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2010). 
16 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2010). Bramson  4 
 
a single missed payment leave many debtors unable to complete their Chapter 13 plans. Sixty-
seven percent fail before completing repayment and receive no discharge at all, and they must 
therefore reenter bankruptcy from the start or leave the system with all debts intact.
17 
  2. Threshold Eligibility:  A Chapter 13 plan may be confirmed when all secured creditors 
will be paid in full
18 and when “all of the debtor’s projected disposable income . . . will be 
applied to make payments to unsecured creditors.”
19 The meaning of “projected” has been the 
subject of much legal and judicial investigation,
20 but “disposable income” is statutorily defined 
as current monthly income reduced by those expenses which are “reasonably necessary” to the 
debtor and his/her family.
21 Interpretation of this standard used to be within each bankruptcy 
judge’s discretion, but BAPCPA
22 amended this test as well, again in the name of reducing 
abuse.
23 As in Chapter 7, BAPCPA created different standards for above- and below-median 
debtors, and it imported the rigid IRS numbers in certain contexts. 
  3. Below-Median Debtors:  In determining what portion of income must be set aside for 
repayment to creditors, the “reasonably necessary” test has been wholly preserved for below-
median debtors. No further guidance is provided in the statute, however, and bankruptcy judges 
must decide for themselves what expenses they deem necessary “for the maintenance or support 
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,”
24 subject only to very infrequent and deferential 
appellate review by Article III courts.
25 
                                                 
17 Scott F. Norberg, Chapter 13 Project: Little Paid to Unsecureds, 26-MAR AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 54 (2007). 
18 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (2010). 
19 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2010).  
20 See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct. 2464 (2010).  
21 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2010). 
22 See text accompanying notes 4-7. 
23 Lauren Sylvester, Redefining Disposable Income in Chapter 13: Moving Forward into a “New Era in the History 
of Bankruptcy Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1107, 1110-13 (2009). 
24 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
25 Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 777-84 
(2010) (adding that removal of bankruptcy judges from Article III status has exacerbated the problem). Bramson  5 
 
  4. Above-Median Debtors:  Debtors with incomes above the state median must also meet 
the “reasonably necessary” test, but judges have very little discretion in confirming or rejecting 
expenses for these individuals. Instead, the Code explains that the amounts considered necessary 
shall be those available under the Chapter 7 means test in § 707(b)(2).
26 Again, debtors are 
therefore referred to the IRS National and Local Standards, as well as to the other statutory 
allowances discussed above.
27 
While this standard seems symmetrical to that in Chapter 7, many scholars have criticized 
BAPCPA’s importation of the means-test numbers into Chapter 13 as inapposite. In Chapter 7, 
the § 707(b)(2) numbers are used merely to determine eligibility for relief, while in Chapter 13 
they dictate what consumers may spend for up to five years.
28 What were merely quirks in 
Chapter 7 may be severe constraints in Chapter 13. Using fixed numbers instead of those that the 
debtor reports may also lead to an artificially-low calculation of disposable income, which is 
unfair both to creditors and to below-median debtors not entitled to this advantage.
29 
A summary of the standards discussed thus far is available in Table 1. That table also 
offers the names of those standards as they will appear in the rest of this paper. Note that while 
this is a two-by-two grid, there are only three standards, as the test for expenditures is identical 
for above-median debtors in both applicable chapters. Also note that while the term “means test” 
is somewhat imprecise for Chapter 13—it uses the means test numbers, but in the context of 
budget confirmation—the legal literature uses it in this context. 
 
 
                                                 
26 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2010). 
27 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010). 
28 Chelsey W. Tulis, Get Real: Reframing the Debate Over How to Calculate Projected Income in §1325(b), 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 345, 356-58 (2009). 
29 Id. at 358-60. Bramson  6 
 
 
  Below-Median-Income  Above-Median-Income 
CHAPTER 7 
   Threshold 
   Eligibility 
 
Liquidation bankruptcy available 
unless court determines that relief 
would be an “abuse” of the system. 
 
Presumption of abuse and 
ineligibility if debtor fails means 
test. Failure if income less defined 
expenses exceeds statutory limits. 
   Authority 
 
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) 
 
11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) 
   Name of Standard 
 
Abuse 
 
Means Test 
CHAPTER 13 
   Threshold 
   Eligibility 
 
Bankruptcy plan confirmed if all 
disposable income is used to 
recompense creditors.  
 
Disposable income = Current 
Monthly Income minus 
“reasonably necessary” expenses, 
as determined by the court. 
 
Bankruptcy plan confirmed if all 
disposable income is used to 
recompense creditors.  
 
Disposable income = Current 
Monthly Income minus 
“reasonably necessary” expenses, 
as determined by §707(b)(2). 
   Authority 
 
11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(2) 
 
11 U.S.C. §1325(b)(3) 
   Name of Standard 
 
Reasonably Necessary 
 
Means Test 
Table 1: Threshold eligibility requirements for Chapter 7 and 13 debtors, statutory authority for 
these tests, and the nomenclature for these standards in this paper. 
 
 
II.  SUBSTANCES IN BANKRUPTCY: THE CODE’S TREATMENT OF 
FOOD, DRUGS AND CIGARETTES 
 
  We now embark on a deeper discussion of how the Bankruptcy Code and the courts that 
interpret it treat payments for three products: food, pharmaceutical drugs, and cigarettes. These 
three products seem distinct, but they share three appealing features that make for an interesting 
analysis. First, all three are arguably considered necessities by those who purchase them, so 
limits  to  their  allowance  should  be  carefully  considered.  Second,  they  represent  the  varying Bramson  7 
 
degrees to which the bankruptcy system is willing to say “no” to debtors, ranging from almost no 
limits on drugs to near-complete disallowance for cigarettes. Third, as we will see, they provide a 
window into some of the inequitable and inconsistent effects in the bankruptcy system. 
A. FOOD IN BANKRUPTCY 
  Although food is essential to every debtor’s survival, the amount of food allowed is by no 
means an easy determination. As we will see, how much a family in bankruptcy is entitled to 
spend on food, as well as the standards used to evaluate the expenses, depends largely on what 
chapter of bankruptcy the debtor is in. The amounts  
  1. Means-Test:  For above-median debtors, § 707 of the Code cross-references to the IRS 
National Standards, which give concrete numbers for food consumption based on household size, 
as shown in Table 2.
30 These allowances are fairly inflexible, subject only to a 5% increase upon 
a showing of necessity.
31 Note that government benefits like WIC (Women, Infants and Children 
Nutrition Program) and SNAP (Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program) must be included 
in income,
32 so debtors who receive these benefits do not double their food expenses. 
Household Size   
Food Allowance 
Per Month 
 
1  2  3  4
33 
Gross
34  $300  $537  $639  $757 
Average  $300  $269  $213  $189 
Marginal  $300  $237  $102  $118 
Per-Meal
35  $3.28  $2.93  $2.33  $2.07 
Table 2: Food expenditures allowed under the means test and the IRS National Standards. 
                                                 
30 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2010). 
31 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2010). 
32 Justice.gov, Form B22A, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/defs/docs/samples/BK_Form_B22A_V1.pdf. 
33 An additional $262 allowance is allowed for additional members of the household. This is a comprehensive 
amount that includes expenditures for food, clothing, and other personal products and services. 
34 IRS.gov, supra note 12. Only the top-line numbers are provided by the IRS; all others were calculated here. 
35 Assuming an average of 3 meals per day and 30.5 days per month. Bramson  8 
 
  An  examination  of  these  numbers  reveals  several  peculiarities  about  how  the  system 
works. First, the IRS Standards produce steep scaling effects, with both the marginal and average 
expenditures allowed dropping off precipitously as the household size grows. Elizabeth Warren 
has sardonically observed that “the IRS evidently believes that there are important economies of 
scale in meal preparation,”
36 and indeed this is precisely how the system works. Because larger 
families tend to buy in bulk, their proportionally lower expenses are reflected in the BLS’s 
Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey.
37 Nevertheless, these effects can be harsh, especially for 
households that for any reason cannot or simply do not shop and cook like the average family. A 
family of four receives only 63% of the per-capita amount received by individuals; for some of 
them, cutting corners on food may become a necessity. 
  Second, the IRS numbers are not particularized to individual and family characteristics. A 
family of three will receive $639 per month for food, regardless of whether the family consists of 
a single mother with two young children or a middle-aged couple with an elderly dependent, 
even though these households’ expenditures may significantly diverge. The omission of any 
particularized factors is especially striking given that the BLS already collects such numbers in 
the CE Survey that the IRS Standards are based on. The BLS publishes expenditure data broken 
down by age, sex, race, education, marital status, occupation, location, etc.
38 Although not all of 
these would be relevant in the bankruptcy context, the inclusion of at least some of them (such as 
age, marital status, or geography
39) might more accurately reflect what debtors require. 
  Third, the means-test numbers for food have no bearing at all on what a family should 
spend, only to what they may spend, based on what the average family does spend. Nutrition 
                                                 
36 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 155. 
37 See text accompanying notes 11-13. 
38 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, supra note 13. 
39 The geographical variation in food prices will be discussed in detail in Part III.B. Bramson  9 
 
concerns  are  not  even  mentioned,
40  and  the  process  is  wholly  divorced  from  normative 
considerations  like  fairness.  This  omission  may  reflect  a  congressional  desire  to  promote 
objectivity in the Bankruptcy Code, but ultimately it is a failure and missed opportunity. 
  Fourth,  the  expenditure  numbers  allowed  under  the  means  test  are  not  decreased  for 
debtors who under-spend.
41 Because the inflexible IRS numbers act in part as a floor, those who 
spend less than the allowances get a windfall from their creditors. For example, lawyers who 
may expense meals to their firms are still entitled to the full IRS allowance, even if their out-of-
pocket expenses are lower. Such results were impossible before the passage of BAPCPA. 
The fifth and final consequence is the inverse of the fourth: those with above-average 
expenses are constrained by the IRS standards, as the means test also acts as a ceiling. In one 
case, for example, a Chapter 13 debtor incurred food and personal expenses that exceeded IRS 
allowances  by  $261.85,  predominately  because  he  often  had  to  work  out  of  town.
42  The 
Bankruptcy Court rejected these expenses, explaining that § 1325(b) left no room for judicial 
discretion, even in cases that suggest a need for flexibility.
43 This restriction is slightly less harsh 
in Chapter 7, where a failure of the means test leads only to a presumption of abuse that may still 
be rebutted,
44 but in reality the IRS standards impose a fairly tight lid. 
  Common  experience  teaches  us  that  food  expenses  vary  widely  based  on  individual 
characteristics, family size, and countless other work-related or personal idiosyncrasies. For the 
time being, however, above-median debtors and their creditors remain constrained by the rigid 
and derivative numbers in the IRS standards. As one scholar noted, “Congress demonstrated a 
                                                 
40 People with expensive dietary restrictions (e.g. gluten-free) must rebut the presumption of abuse under §707(b).  
41 For cars, the results are even more unusual: a car owner can claim the full car lien expense, simply because the 
means test has no provision for adjustments. Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S.Ct. 716 (2011). 
42 In re Tuss, 360 B.R. 684 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007).  
43 Id. at 690-96. 
44 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(B) (2010). Bramson  10 
 
determination  to  replace  judicial  discretion  under  general  standards  with  precise  rules-based 
calculations. One can understand why bankruptcy judges would chafe at such restrictions, but 
that does not mean that Congress did not mean what it said.”
45 
  2. “Abuse” Standard:  As discussed earlier, below-median debtors are entitled to Chapter 
7  bankruptcy  unless  the  court  determines  such  relief  would  be  an  “abuse”  of  the  system.
46 
Unfortunately, the Code gives no further guidance, leaving the administration of this vague test 
to individual bankruptcy judges. Courts generally look at the “totality of the circumstances” on a 
case-by-case  basis,
47  with  some  judges  attempting  to  craft  common-law  tests.
48 T he  lack  of 
unifying principles, however, has predictably led to a wide variation in the determination of what 
expenses, particularly regarding food, are considered abusive. 
  In measuring food expenses, many courts use federally-provided numbers to anchor their 
analysis.  Some  courts,  for  example,  use  the  IRS  Standards  as  their  basis  for  what  is  non-
abusive,
49 while others cite to different agencies like the Census Bureau.
50 In most of the cases 
that  reach  litigation,  however,  the  standard  used  for  evaluating  food  expenses  is  not  made 
explicit.  Instead,  the  petition  is  either  confirmed  or  denied  with  little  or  no  discussion  of 
particular expenses, especially relatively small ones like food.
51  
                                                 
45 Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 665, 682 (2005). 
46 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2010). 
47  David  B.  Harrison,  Bankruptcy:  When  Does  Filing  of  Chapter  7  Petition  Constitute  “Substantial  Abuse” 
Authorizing Dismissal of Petition Under 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b), 122 A.L.R. Fed. 141 (1986). This Report has 
been continuously updated and now contains analysis reflecting the post-BAPCPA “abuse” standard. 
48 E.g., In re Boule, 415 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2009); In re Martin, 417 B.R. 254 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2009); In re 
Schwenk, 414 B.R. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2009); In re Hand, 323 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2005). 
49 In re Wiedner, 344 B.R. 321, 326 (Bankr. M.D. Pa., 2005). Widespread use of this standard would, interestingly, 
collapse § 707 back into a single test.   
50 In re Grant, 51 B.R. 385, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) 
51 See, e.g., In re Boatright, 414 B.R. 526 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (finding no abuse where, inter alia, debtor 
claimed  $750.00  food  expense  for  a  family  of  four);  In  re  Colgate,  370  B.R.  50  (Bankr.  E.D.N.Y.  2007) 
(finding abuse where, inter alia, debtor claimed $1,000.00 food expense for a family of four).  Bramson  11 
 
Although the standards actually applied by the courts are cryptic, it is fair to say that 
many judges are disinclined to give debtors the benefit of the doubt on their food expenses. 
Cases abound where judges simply decide, without explanation, that an amount is excessive, 
using colloquial phrases such as “unusually high”
52 or “more than adequate.”
53  
Certain categories of food expenditures also seem to incur the ire of judges more readily 
than  others.  While  no  per  se  rules  exist  against  classes  of  food  (not  even  alcohol),  eating 
frequently  in  restaurants  is  troublesome  to  judges,
54  and  organic  food  is  nearly  out  of  the 
question.
55 The amounts in the cited cases are admittedly high, and those who eat in restaurants 
or eat expensive food may indeed be more likely to be abusing the system. That said, when 
judges look to these factors instead of just the amounts spent, they run the risk of basing access 
to the statutory protections of bankruptcy not on financial criteria but on lifestyle choices. 
Of course, such harsh treatment of Chapter 7 debtors is not characteristic of all judges. 
Many courts are flexible in allowing higher expenses under particular circumstances, such as 
needing to dine out because of job requirements or residence in a group home.
56 Nonetheless, the 
general trend is against allowing high food expenses, especially above the IRS numbers. This 
distorts the meaning of “abuse”—it is hard to imagine that a family of five spending $1,200 per 
month on food (including dining out) is truly abusing the system, even if they have failed to 
“engage in some good, old-fashioned belt tightening,”
57  
Finding abuse so readily also ignores the realities of family behavior on the brink of 
bankruptcy. Instead of rampant abuse and excessive expenses, many households are forced to cut 
                                                 
52 In re Camp, 416 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009) (rejecting a $1,200 food expense for a family of three). 
53 In re McClellan, 428 B.R. 737 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting a $1,200 food expense for a family of four). 
54 In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123 (6th
 Cir. 1989) (rejecting a dining-out expense of over $1,000 for a two-person 
household); In re Camp, supra note 52 (rejecting a $1,200 food budget, much of it allocated to dining out). 
55 In re Srikantia, 417 B.R. 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting a $700 organic food expense for two). 
56 In re Farrell, 150 B.R. 116 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1992) (allowing a $530 food expense for one person). 
57 See In re Scarberry, 428 B.R. 403 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting $1,200 food budget for family of five). Bramson  12 
 
back on basic expenditures, with a full 19.4% going without food at some point within the two 
years  before  filing.
58  If  judges  are  indeed  re-conceiving  of  this  vulnerable  population  as 
presumptive abusers, then Chapter 7 is in danger of severe underutilization. 
3. “Reasonably Necessary” Standard:  Below-median debtors in Chapter 13 must acquire 
approval for their expenses under the “reasonably necessary” standard discussed in Part I.B.3.
59 
Like the “abuse” model, this standard suffers from a failure of specificity, and the courts have 
predictably struggled to promulgate a coherent set of principles for deciding what is reasonable. 
Even  when  judges  have  developed  actual  criteria,  they  tend  to  rely  on  balancing  tests  that 
provide no more clarity than the statute itself, such as “whether the expense is excessive,” or 
“whether expenses are deliberately inflated and unreasonable.”
60 
As  a  result  of  this  confusion,  general  trends  are  hard  to  identify.  Not  even  the  IRS 
Standards,  which  provide  a  benchmark  for  what  level  of  food  expenses  is  expected  in 
bankruptcy,
61  guarantee  any  certainty,  for  some  plans  with  below-IRS  food  budgets  are 
rejected,
62  while  some  with  above-IRS  budgets  are  confirmed.
63  Flexibility  is  sometimes 
afforded  to  debtors—large  food  budgets  have  been  approved  for  those  who  must  dine  out 
frequently because of job contingencies,
64 for example. Such treatment is by no means universal, 
however, and the search for identifiable standards remains elusive. 
Part of the analytical problem is that, unlike in Chapter 7, debtors in Chapter 13 are not 
attempting to justify past expenditures, but rather are seeking approval for prospective expenses. 
                                                 
58  David  U.  Himmelstein  et  al.,  Illness  and  Injury  as  Contributors  to  Bankruptcy,  24  Health  Affairs  63  (Web 
Supplement, 2005). 
59 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) (2010). 
60 See, e.g., In re Short, 2008 WL 5751873 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing In re Navarro, 83 B.R. 348, 355-56 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988)). 
61 In re Miller, 409 B.R. 299, 318 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
62 In re Stein, 91 B.R. 796 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (rejecting a $780 food budget for a family of five). 
63 In re Short, supra note 60 (confirming a $310 food budget for an individual). 
64 In re Presley, 201 B.R. 570 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996) (accepting a $400 food budget because the debtor had to eat 
away from home 2-3 meals per day). Bramson  13 
 
These debtors are therefore unlikely to report large amounts for food, and even less likely to 
itemize for questionable expenses like dining out or organic food.
65 We are left with very limited 
case law addressing the adequacy or excessiveness of food costs in Chapter 13. 
B. DRUGS IN BANKRUPTCY 
In comparison to the allowances for food, debtors’ expenses on drugs and other health 
costs are afforded almost complete deference by the Bankruptcy Code and courts. Let us begin 
our analysis with an investigation of the treatment of drugs by the means test. 
1. Means-Test:  Drug expenses are categorized by § 707(b) as part of “Out-of-Pocket 
Health Costs,” and are determined by the IRS National Standards.
66 These expenses, however, 
cross-reference not to the BLS but rather to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, administered 
by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality within the Department of Health and Human 
Services.
67 The AHRQ and IRS allow expenditures of $60 for each family member under 65, and 
$144 for those 65 or older. Remarkably, however, the IRS treats this number only as a floor. Any 
amount in excess may be claimed under the means test, provided it is necessary, substantiated, 
and not for elective expenses “such as plastic surgery or elective dental work.”
68 
Age of Family Member   
Health Cost Allowance 
Per Person Per Month 
 
Under 65  65 or Older 
Minimum  $60  $144 
Maximum  All expenses allowed if necessary, substantiated and non-elective. 
Table 3: Drug/health expenditures allowed under the means test and the IRS National Standards. 
 
                                                 
65 See text accompanying notes 54-55. 
66 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2010). 
67 AHRQ, Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/. 
68  No  other  categories  of  IRS  expenses  share  the  same  reference.  IRS.gov,  National  Standards:  Out-of-Pocket 
Health Care, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=173385,00.html. Bramson  14 
 
Nearly all of the consequences associated with food in the means test are moot for drug 
expenditures. Because the allowance is per-person instead of per-household, there are no scaling 
effects triggered by declining marginal expenses. Moreover, the lack of a ceiling means that 
those with extraordinary expenses are in no way constrained by the IRS Standards. It seems 
Congress
69 has made a normative choice that no debtor should have to forego medical decisions 
for the sake of their existing creditors. 
The lack of a ceiling on health expenditures is the dominant feature of this allowance, but 
two other aspects also stand out. First, the existence of the expense floor means that those who 
spend less than the provided amounts get a windfall from their creditors, an anomalous result 
confirmed by the courts.
70 Second, neither Congress nor the IRS has put any limitation on the 
effectiveness of the goods or services purchased, except indirectly through the “necessity” prong. 
For example, drugs purchased need not be FDA-approved, and “alternative” treatments such as 
acupuncture or chelation therapy may be reimbursed as medical services. 
While  the  Code  itself  has  enabled  this  sweeping  allowance,  the  IRS  does  retain  the 
restrictions  mentioned  above:  necessary,  substantiated,  and  non-elective.  Nonetheless,  these 
limitations do very little work in practice, and the courts seem unwilling to deny the claims even 
in cases where one or more of the criteria are plainly triggered. In Leggett, for example, debtors 
claimed $12,720 in orthodontic expenses for their children; the court allowed the expenditures 
without even a cursory investigation of either the necessity or electiveness prongs,
71 even though 
the IRS explicitly disallows “elective dental work.”
72 
                                                 
69 Or perhaps just the IRS, if Congress did not anticipate their limitless allowance for health costs. 
70 In re Melancon, 400 B.R. 521, 525 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009) (“debtors are entitled to claim the national standard 
health care expenses on the means test form for purposes of determining disposable income, whether or not 
their documented prepetition health care expenses are lower than the national standard”). 
71 In re Leggett, 2011 WL 802806 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2011). 
72 IRS.gov, National Standards: Out-of-Pocket Health Care, supra note 68. Bramson  15 
 
In short, the judges who evaluate these cases seem content in their deference to debtors’ 
health claims. Indeed, it is difficult to identify even a single case where an above-median debtor 
failed the Chapter 7 means test or had a Chapter 13 expense denied on these grounds. Some of 
this may be self-selection, for it is unlikely that an informed debtor would attempt to claim an 
egregious or unsubstantiated claim, but judicial deference is still the norm. 
  2.  Below-Median  Standards:    The  courts’  treatment  of  the  “abuse”  and  “reasonably 
necessary” standards is so similar for drugs that we will discuss them simultaneously here. As 
with above-median debtors, judges have tended to be very lenient on the provision of health and 
drug expenditures in bankruptcy filings. Very few cases have spoken directly to the issue of what 
expenses  are  allowable  under  the  bankruptcy  provisions,  and  those  that  have  done  so  have 
granted extensive deference.
73 Indeed, only when an expense lacks substantiation do courts seem 
willing to reject a claim as unnecessary or abusive.
74 
  Once again, it is clear that Congress—either directly or through the IRS—has made a 
normative determination that it should not be within the province of the courts to deny drug or 
health expenses to debtors except in extreme circumstances. The courts have gladly acquiesced 
in  this  decision.  While  food  expenses  do  not  get  the  same  deference,  there  is  perhaps  a 
reasonable basis for the distinction: drug consumption varies much more significantly that do 
food expenses, and the consequences of underutilizing clinically-indicated drugs are significantly 
more acute than under-eating. Moreover, the problem of under-consumption of drugs is more 
widespread, with a staggering 43.0% of debtors reporting that they failed to fill a prescription 
within the two years preceding bankruptcy.
75 Whatever the reasoning, the outcome is apparent: 
                                                 
73 In re Renner, 70 B.R. 27 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987) (allowing a monthly drug expense of $100); In re Bryant, 47 B.R. 
21 (Bankr. D. N.C. 1984) (allowing monthly medical/drug expense of $200). 
74 In re Lipford, 397 B.R. 320 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2008). 
75 53.6% also neglected needed doctor or dentist appointments. Himmelstein et al., supra note 58. Bramson  16 
 
for all debtors seeking bankruptcy relief, claimed expenses for drugs and health expenditures 
carry a strong presumption of validity. 
C. CIGARETTES IN BANKRUPTCY 
  Thus far, we have seen that the bankruptcy system tends to allow expenses in accordance 
with normative determinations of “necessity,” with food ranking moderately and drugs ranking 
highly. For the 20.6% of American adults who smoke,
76 a physical addiction to nicotine certainly 
creates at least the perception of a necessity, and claiming an expense for a product without 
which the debtor would experience severe withdrawal symptoms is not inherently unreasonable. 
Formal classification of cigarettes as a “necessity,” however, is untenable both as a matter of law 
and public policy. The bankruptcy system reflects this concern, with tobacco expenses generally 
disallowed or judicially rejected. 
  1. Means-Test:  Treatment of cigarettes by § 707(b) is quite straightforward—they are not 
mentioned.
77 Above-median debtors, regardless of chapter, are simply allowed no deductions for 
tobacco expenditures. By contrast, smoking cessation products like nicotine patches could likely 
be characterized as health costs and granted a limitless allowance under the Code.
78 Although 
harsh  to  smokers,  there  is  nothing  facially  absurd  about  this  discrepancy,  as  financial 
disincentives against smoking and incentives for quitting are rational public policy. Nevertheless, 
the  mechanisms  in  place  are  poorly  tailored,  and  the  discussion  that  follows  will  show  the 
unintended effects of the current system.
79 
  The consequences of this disallowance are different based on the chapter under which the 
debtor seeks relief. For those in Chapter 7, it makes the successful filing of a bankruptcy petition 
                                                 
76 Among those in poverty the estimate is 31.1%. CDC.gov, Adult Cigarette Smoking in the United States: Current 
Estimate. http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/adult_data/cig_smoking/index.htm. 
77 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2010). 
78 See Part II.B.1. 
79 Part III will also explain the larger-scale inequities and inconsistencies of this system. Bramson  17 
 
more difficult. What before bankruptcy was perhaps a $100-$200 monthly expense becomes 
excluded under the means test, thus artificially increasing the calculated excess of income over 
expenditures. This pushes the debtor that much closer to the statutory limits of § 707(b)(2)(A)(i), 
which, if exceeded, presumptively forces the debtor into Chapter 13 or out of bankruptcy.
80  
Debtors in Chapter 13 face a different conundrum from the means-test disallowance. 
Because they must live with their confirmed budget for a period of three to five years, such 
debtors must confront the exclusion head-on. They must either quit smoking or reduce their 
expenses on other items, such as food or clothing, to make up the shortfall.
81 There is some 
leeway  built  into  the  system,  such  as  a  National  Standards’  allowance  for  miscellaneous 
expenses,
82 but the tobacco exclusion certainly makes tight Chapter 13 budgets even tighter. In 
turn, this increases the risk of non-completion, which denies the debtors any discharge of their 
debts, thereby undermining the debt-relief purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  2. “Abuse” Standard:  Intuitively, one would expect a standard as broad as “abuse” to 
elicit a wide range of judicial constructions with regards to cigarette expenditures. However, the 
response has been almost universally to reject these expenses, and therefore to disallow Chapter 
7 protections to below-median debtors unless the plan can be revised after the exclusion of 
cigarettes. Courts have rejected cigarette expenses as low as $97 per month,
83 and any expense 
higher than that is nearly certain to be classified as abusive.
84 
                                                 
80 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1) (2010). 
81 Debtors in Chapter 13 need not provide receipts for their expenses during the administration of the plan, so re-
allocating expenses from one category to another will not have adverse legal consequences. 
82 IRS.gov, supra note 12. 
83 In re Peluso, 72 B.R. 732 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
84 See In re Stickney, 370 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2007) ($105/month); Waites v. Braley, 110 B.R. 211 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 1990) ($150-$200/month); In re Newsom, 69 B.R. 801 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987) ($150/month). Bramson  18 
 
  Despite the widespread rejection of cigarette expenses under this standard,
85 courts are 
often insistent that they are not imposing a per se rule against cigarettes, for example by claiming 
that “far more important is consideration of what is to be the fair division of a debtor’s future 
income between his creditors and himself.”
86 This claim is questionable, however, especially 
given the track record of courts evaluating such expenses, and other judges have indeed come 
closer to admitting that cigarette expenditures are per se abusive. In Brooks, for example, the 
presiding  judge  plainly  explained  that  “[c]igarettes  are  not  a  reasonable  necessary  living 
expense,”
87 while also citing to a case that called tobacco a “luxury expense.”
88 
  In rejecting cigarette expenses under this test, courts are also often careful to note that 
they are doing so not out of any personal bias or prejudgment. In Peluso, for instance, the judge 
maintained that “the Court will not impose its personal views as to how one should lead their 
[sic] life.”
89 Once again, however, we should be skeptical of the judges’ assertions, for it is hard 
to imagine that, in the absence of clear law on the matter, judges from around the country would 
come to a ubiquitous consensus unless there were some interference of some personal views 
about the validity of cigarettes as a claimed expenditure.  
3. “Reasonably Necessary” Standard:  Although the standards for below-median debtors 
in Chapters 7 and 13 seem to confer similar discretion on judges, courts evaluating Chapter 13 
plans  are  significantly  more  likely  to  allow  expenses  for  cigarettes  than  in  liquidation 
proceedings. The basic reason for this discrepancy is fairly straightforward: forcing debtors to 
                                                 
85 Note that the majority of Chapter 7 petitions are resolved without trial, and the standard practice of bankruptcy 
judges evaluating uncontested, run-of-the-mill liquidation petitions is not easily determined. 
86 In re Lang, 2007 WL 2777770 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting In re Mars, 340 B.R. 844, 850 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2006), and arguing instead that cigarette expenses merely raise a red flag). 
87 In re Brooks, 406 B.R. 382, 391 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2009). This sounds like a Chapter 13 standard, but the case was 
actually decided under Chapter 7’s “abuse” test. 
88 In re Williams, 233 B.R. 423, 429 (Bankr. D. Mo. 1999). 
89 In re Peluso, supra note 83, at 738. Bramson  19 
 
abstain from cigarettes for three to five years is a much harsher mandate than merely disallowing 
the expenses in a means-test calculation for Chapter 7 eligibility. 
Many courts have addressed the proper treatment of cigarettes for below-median debtors 
in Chapter 13, and they tend to take a fairly nuanced approach to the issue. In Woodman, for 
example, the presiding judge rejected the implementation of a per se rule against cigarettes by 
examining the policy ramifications of such an action.
90 First, a universal disallowance would 
inherently be based on the personal views of judges, and would therefore “clothe subjective 
moral judgments with the force of law.”
91 Second, forbidding an expense for cigarettes would 
unavoidably  lead  to  the  slippery-slope  disallowance  of  all  other  morally  or  economically 
questionable  behavior  (such  as  alcohol,  candy,  or  scented  soap),  putting  the  court  in  the 
uncomfortable position of having to form opinions on the lifestyle choices of debtors.
92 Finally, 
cigarettes are lawful activity, and removing them from bankruptcy budgets “would effectively 
outlaw smoking for all Chapter 13 debtors,”
93 which is beyond the province of the courts. 
Most courts agree with the conclusion that a per se exclusion is the wrong approach in 
Chapter  13,  but  there  remains  no  consensus  on  what  expenses  are  appropriate  under  § 
1325(b)(2), nor even on what approach to take. Many courts, including in Woodman itself, have 
ultimately  decided  to  give  debtors  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  and  to  approve  their  requested 
cigarette expenses.
94 Others preserve the fact-intensive examination proposed by Woodman,
95 
but eventually decide that the cigarette expenses are excessive and must be reduced before the 
                                                 
90 In re Woodman, 287 B.R. 589 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003). 
91 Id. at 592. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 592-93. 
94  In  re  Gharavi,  335  B.R.  492,  499-500  (Bankr.  D.  Mass.  2006)  (citing  Woodman  in  allowing  a  $175/month 
cigarette  expense);  Woodman,  supra  note  90,  at  596-97  (allowing  a  $240/month  cigarette  expense);  In  re 
Regan, 269 B.R. 693, 698 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2001) (allowing a $40/month cigarette expense). 
95 Woodman, supra note 90, at 593 (explaining that “one would be hard-pressed to fashion a more case specific 
standard [than the reasonably-necessary test]”);  In re Buntin, 161 B.R. 466, 468 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) 
(finding a cigarette expense of more than a pack a day unreasonable and unnecessary). Bramson  20 
 
plan can be confirmed.
96 Still others have declined to evaluate the cigarette expenses themselves, 
but rather used them as evidence in a holistic determination that the debtor’s budget allocated an 
unreasonably small amount to creditors.
97 
 
  Standard of Review 
 
  Means-Test  Abuse  Reasonably Necessary 
 
Food 
 
Gross amounts listed in 
IRS Standards. 
 
-Scaling effects. 
-Not particularized. 
-No normative 
considerations. 
-No upward or downward 
variation possible. 
 
 
Judicial discretion, with 
large variation in 
standards applied. 
 
Some short-hand 
exclusionary rules 
against certain expenses. 
 
Many judges flexible. 
 
Ambiguous balancing 
tests commonly created. 
 
General trends hard to 
identify here. 
 
Drugs 
 
Minimum allowance in 
IRS Standards. 
 
Unlimited expenses 
allowed if necessary, 
substantiated, and not 
elective. 
 
 
Extremely lenient and 
deferential to debtors. 
 
Extremely lenient and 
deferential to debtors. 
 
Cigarettes 
 
Not mentioned in Code. 
No allowance. 
 
 
 
Almost always rejected by 
judges as abusive. 
 
No per se rule against 
cigarettes, but actual 
treatment varies. 
Table 4: Summary of the treatment of three substances under the three bankruptcy standards. 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 In re Webster, 2002 WL 32700045 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (reducing a cigarette expenditure from $250 to $100). 
97 In re Smith, 1995 WL 20345 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995); In re Johnson, 115 B.R. 159 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990). Bramson  21 
 
III.  ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S AND 
JUDGES’ TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCES 
 
A. HORIZONTAL INEQUITY: CHAPTER 7 VERSUS CHAPTER 13 
 
As we have seen, debtors in the two relevant chapters are not treated equally by the 
bankruptcy  system,  with  Chapter  13  claimants  afforded  substantially  more  latitude  in  their 
expenses than those in Chapter 7. Although flexible at times, judges are quick to reject high food 
expenses in Chapter 7, and often have de facto rules against whole categories of expenditures, 
such  as  dining  out.
98  Cigarettes  are  even  harder  to  claim,  with  judges  universally  rejecting 
Chapter 7 cigarette expenses.
99 In Chapter 13, by comparison, judges seem to be flexible with 
food costs,
100 and they even accept cigarettes if the amounts requested are reasonable.
101 
It is a general principle of law that parties in the same situation ought to be treated 
similarly under the law
102—a concept known as horizontal equity. It does not necessarily follow 
from this that two people seeking protection under different chapters of a statute should be 
governed identically, but where possible the law should still promote uniformity. There is value 
in consistency itself, and if the law creates undue incentives for one chapter over another—in this 
example,  for  Chapter  13  over  Chapter  7—it  is  essentially  diluting  the  statutory  protections 
available under the Bankruptcy Code.
103 
In theory, the various bankruptcy provisions exist to maximize the returns to creditors 
without sacrificing the debtors’ chances of financial recovery, and any differences in the two 
chapters may reasonably be attributable to the differing legal necessities of the two separate 
                                                 
98 See supra Part II.A.2. 
99 See supra Part II.C.2. 
100 See supra Part II.A.3. 
101 See supra Part II.C.3. 
102 Aristotle, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 313-17 (H. Rackham trans., Everyman’s Library ed., 1947). 
103 Cf. Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a Distraction and the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission’s Proposals as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 11-13 
(discussing the “forms and causes of lack of uniformity in the current system”). Bramson  22 
 
paradigms. Likewise, the fact that Chapter 13 debtors remain in bankruptcy for three to five 
years perhaps justifies more lenient treatment than in Chapter 7.  
Although this reasoning is plausible, the language of the Bankruptcy Code instead seems 
actively to promote horizontal equity: above-median debtors are governed by identical rules in 
both chapters, and below-median debtors’ expenses are evaluated by similar standards of review. 
Moreover, while the differing nature of the two chapters may justify discrepancies in financial 
matters like secured debt or outstanding contracts, it should not affect allowable expenses on 
basic necessities like food or drugs. The allowance for these substances, rather, speaks to what a 
reasonable person in financial distress should be allowed to consume, regardless of whether that 
analysis is for determining liquidation eligibility or evaluating the adequacy of a pay-out plan. 
A  textualist  reading  of  the  statute  is  therefore  insufficient  to  explain  the  asymmetric 
treatment. Instead, it is likely that the discrepancies are perpetuated by a systemic preference of 
Chapter 13 plans over Chapter 7, both by Congress and by bankruptcy judges. This motivation 
was explicit in the legislative history of BAPCPA,
104 and it now seems an intractable feature of 
expense evaluation. In Chapter 13, which requires only that a cost be reasonably necessary, 
Congress sought primarily to prevent luxury expenditures, not to deny basic expenses during the 
plan’s  administration.
105  Chapter  7,  especially  after  BAPCPA,  instead  anticipates  abusive 
behavior by debtors who are seeking to avoid their financial responsibilities with a quick fix.
106 
The distinction is intangible, but it is also undeniable and unfortunate. Treating one class of 
debtors as trustworthy and another as villainous, even though in practice they are often quite 
interchangeable, seems to undermine the very notion of horizontal equity. 
                                                 
104 See generally Jensen, supra note 4. 
105 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 10, at ¶ 1325.11. 
106 Id. at ¶ 707.04. Bramson  23 
 
B. HORIZONTAL INEQUITY: GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION 
  The Bankruptcy Code, as a federal statute designed largely to protect consumers, ought to 
treat  debtors  from  all  parts  of  the  country  equally.  The  language  of  the  Code  achieves  this 
neutrality, and its treatment of drug and cigarette expenses also seems consonant with this goal, 
with one nearly always approved and the other nearly always rejected. When we look at how 
food is treated, however, we see that there is actually wide geographic variation. 
  Classification as above- or below-median is accomplished by comparing the debtor’s 
income  to  the  state  median,  in  order  to  reflect  geographic  earning  disparities.
107  When 
determining the allowances under the means test, however, most expenses (including food) are 
based on the IRS National Standards, which have no geographic component and therefore take 
no measure of regional variations in prices and cost of living. 
  In  order  to  make  this  problem  more  concrete,  let  us  imagine  two Chapter  13  debtor 
families of three people, one in Boston and one in Atlanta, each earning $100,000 per year. In 
Massachusetts, the current median income for such a family is $83,736, while in Georgia it is 
$56,682;
108 therefore both families are above the median, though our Atlanta family is relatively 
much better off. The IRS Standards set aside $639 per month for food.
109 An average family of 
three in Boston, however, spends $851 per month due to high prices of food in the city,
 110 and 
they will therefore likely face a shortfall in bankruptcy. By contrast, an average Atlanta family of 
                                                 
107 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(6), 707(b)(7), 1325(b)(3). 
108 U.S. Trustee Program, Census Bureau Median Family Income by Family Size (filed on or after 3/15/2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20110315/bci_data/median_income_table.htm. 
109 IRS Standards, supra note 12. 
110 The average Boston household has 2.4 members and spends $8,167 on food per year. Simple arithmetic gives an 
average monthly expense of $850.73 for a family of 3. BLS.gov, Table 21. Selected Northeastern Metropolitan 
Statistical  Areas:  Average  Annual  Expenditures  and  Characteristics,  Consumer  Expenditure  Survey,  2008-
2009. http://www.bls.gov/cex/2009/msas/norteast.pdf. Bramson  24 
 
three spends only $560 for food, leaving them with a significant surplus.
111 If this family instead 
lived in rural Georgia, the discrepancy would be even greater. 
  What is most amazing about this feature of the bankruptcy system is how easily it could 
be avoided. The BLS’ Consumer Expenditure Survey, on which the IRS bases its standards, 
already collects regional, state, and even local data on food prices, and these data could therefore 
be  implemented  into  the  means  test  numbers  with  little  difficulty.  The  IRS  has  offered  no 
explanation for this omission, and there seems no valid justification other than simplicity. So 
glaring is the omission that an administrative challenge to the standard claiming “arbitrary and 
capricious” rulemaking might require an alteration to the rule. 
  The  existing  system  is  poorly-constructed  and  plainly  unfair.  Half  of  above-median 
debtors currently find themselves with an insufficient food budget, while the other half receives a 
windfall from their creditors. Both creditors and debtors would therefore benefit from a more 
individualized  system  that  evaluates  actual  food  needs,  as  existed  before  BAPCPA. 
Alternatively, Congress could require the IRS to base its standards on regional, state, or local 
food prices in order to reflect the necessary costs more accurately. Until Congress or the IRS 
decides to implement these changes, the inequities of geographic variation will persist. 
C. VERTICAL INEQUITY: ABOVE-MEDIAN VERSUS BELOW-MEDIAN 
 
  In light of the substance discussions in Part II, it is not immediately clear which class of 
debtors  (above-median  or  below-median)  gets  better  treatment  under  the  Bankruptcy  Code. 
Below-median debtors in Chapter 13, unlike above-median debtors in either chapter, have a 
reasonable chance of getting their cigarette expenses approved.
112 On the other hand, above-
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median debtors have a statutorily-guaranteed limitless allowance for drug and health costs,
113 
while those below the median are at least theoretically constrained by judicial discretion.
114 As 
for food, more flexibility is available for below-median debtors, but their expenses are also 
subject to greater scrutiny and a higher likelihood of rejection for normative reasons.
115 
  This overall confusion is largely due to the establishment of the means test by BAPCPA, 
which,  as  one  court  noted,  leads  to  anomalous  and  unpredictable  results  for  above-median 
debtors.
116 That same court, in quoting bankruptcy judge Keith Lundin, explained that the means 
test numbers will “routinely be both insufficient to sustain life and in excess of any amount that 
would survive the reasonable and necessary test of pre-BAPCPA law.”
117 At times, either group 
might receive preferential treatment, but the differences will be based not on any legislative 
reasoning but rather on the arbitrary effects of the extant IRS numbers. This leads to random and 
unprincipled inequities throughout the entire bankruptcy system. 
  Although below-median debtors are sometimes treated better than above-median filers, 
most  scholars  agree  that  in  the  aggregate  above-median  debtors  are  treated  much  more 
generously by the Code. This is attributable to the fact that “in practice it is more common that 
the debtor's actual expenses are below the IRS standard allowances.”
118 We saw this possibility 
for both food and drugs, but the observation is even more acute for other types of expenses not 
discussed in this paper, such as the uncapped allowances for payments of secured debts attached 
to cars and primary residences, both of which give above-median debtors enormous advantages 
over their below-median counterparts.
119 
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  This income-based differential treatment has several flaws. First, inconsistencies like this 
should  generally  be  avoided,  as  they  add  complexity  by  requiring  two  separate  standards. 
Second,  the  generous  treatment  of  above-median  debtors  is  unfair  to  creditors,
120  who  are 
essentially forced to subsidize many costs that would likely be rejected under a less deferential 
standard. Third, and most importantly, preferential treatment for wealthier debtors is patently 
unjust, a form of vertical inequity that the law should avoid when possible. Some scholars have 
suggested that this current problem is so widespread as to require judicial scrutiny,
121 but so far 
the courts have not been open to equal protection constitutional challenges.
122 
  The current system is certainly better than it was just a few years ago. Between the 
creation of the means test in 2005 and the end of 2007, those with higher incomes were legally 
entitled to higher allowances under the IRS Standards; the richest individuals, for example, got 
$483 per month for food, while the poorest got only $175.
123 The IRS quietly replaced this 
arrangement in 2008, but the systemic bias against below-median debtors remains, albeit in more 
subtle forms. In its attempt to fight debtor abuse, a danger that scholars now agree was little 
more than a phantasm,
124 Congress seems to have embraced vertical inequity. Until amended, the 
bankruptcy system will remain burdened by this symbolic failure. 
D. INCONSISTENCY: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LAW 
 
  Any statute that allows for significant judicial discretion will unavoidably lead to wide 
variations in how judges interpret and implement the law. When such variation exceeds normal 
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levels, however, it can lead to unpredictability and unfair inconsistency, with individuals treated 
arbitrarily by a system that lacks federal cohesion. 
  Unfortunately, the bankruptcy system shows signs of such inconsistency, largely due to 
inherent ambiguity in phrases like “abuse” and “reasonably necessary.” In reviewing this issue, 
for example, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission found that “[C]hapter 13 practices 
differ from state to state, district to district, and even from judge to judge,”
125 and therefore that 
“debtors  in  similar  circumstances  encountered  very  different  [C]hapter  13  systems.”
126  The 
problem was unfortunately not addressed by BAPCPA, and if anything has gotten worse: 
It is now two years since the effective date of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, and as shown by extensive majority and 
minority  positions  on  a  significant  number  of  its  provisions,  there  is  little 
consensus on much of the enacted text of BAPCPA. . . . Although it would be 
unreasonable  to  expect  complete,  or  nearly  complete,  uniformity  in  the 
interpretation of BAPCPA, the stark differences in how the new law is being 
interpreted throughout the nation's bankruptcy courts have compromised, if not 
crippled,  any  pretense  of  predictability  in  the  analysis  a  court  might  apply  in 
interpreting its many poorly drafted provisions.
127 
 
  This problem is evident in the Code’s treatment of substances. It is difficult to tell when 
food expenses will be deemed excessive,
128 and different courts have come to every conceivable 
conclusion on what (if any) cigarette expenses are reasonably necessary.
129 Inconsistency is not 
easily solved, but Congress could blunt its effects by issuing clarifying language or by declaring 
background expense numbers—although such fixes could potentially cause further problems. 
The Supreme Court could do the same by offering its own construction of the relevant standards. 
Until some fix occurs, however, debtors will be at a loss for what they may spend. 
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E. INCONSISTENCY: BANKRUPTCY VERSUS OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES 
 
  Few  legal  scholars  argue  that  all  federal  statutes  share  a  common  purpose,  or  that 
unconnected  agencies  write  rules  with  mutual  uniformity.  Nevertheless,  consistency  in  the 
administration of federal laws is an important goal, both for increasing predictability in the legal 
system  and  for  the  symbolic  reason  of  promoting  cohesion  in  the  language,  missions,  and 
operations of the various statutes and agencies. 
  A  quick  glance  at  the  treatment  of  substances  by  the  bankruptcy  system  reveals  a 
stunning lack of federal uniformity. Regarding drugs, the Code essentially forces creditors to pay 
for their debtors’ drug and health expenditures. This is without regard to whether the drugs 
purchased  are  approved  by  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration,  or  to  whether  the  medical 
services are sufficiently medically-indicated as to be covered by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services.
130 Adding requirements such as these might not drastically affect bankruptcy 
cases, but at the very least it would assure creditors that the courts will not force them to pay for 
products and services that other arms of the government do not even recognize. 
  As  for  cigarettes,  the  opposite  problem  arises.  Although  several  state  and  local 
governments have banned smoking in certain settings, the purchase and use of cigarettes remains 
lawful activity throughout the United States. On the other hand, the IRS Standards do not allow 
them to be purchased, and most bankruptcy judges reject tobacco expenditures as unnecessary or 
abusive.
131 The result is quite troublesome: the statutory protections of the Bankruptcy Code are 
essentially unavailable to people who are engaging in lawful activity. 
  The allowances for food under the means test also expose a troubling inconsistency. 
These numbers, codified by the IRS, are based on the BLS’ Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
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which  tracks  actual  spending  patterns,  rather  than  the  amounts  actually  necessary  or 
recommended.
132 This is despite the fact that other government agencies, such as the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA), have developed standards for what households should 
be spending on a healthy diet. Inconsistency between the numbers is a serious failure. 
  The first thing that becomes clear when looking at the USDA figures, which are collected 
by the Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion (CNPP), is that they differentiate based on the 
age and sex of the family members.
133 This more accurately reflects how much food is required, 
but is a feature entirely ignored by the IRS, which simply uses aggregate numbers.
134 In short, 
the  Bankruptcy  Code  tells  families  that  they  get  a  flat  amount  regardless  of  family 
characteristics, while the USDA down the street acknowledges that men eat more than women 
and that older children eat more than toddlers. The inconsistency is glaring. 
  The second discrepancy appears in the analysis of the numbers themselves. The USDA 
CNPP offer four tiers of healthy food plans, corresponding to a Thrifty, Low-Cost, Moderate-
Cost,  or  Liberal  food  budget.
135  When  comparing  these  amounts  to  those  under  the  IRS 
Standards, however, it is clear that the IRS numbers bear little relation to what the government 
has elsewhere determined. The IRS budget for a family of two is $537 per month, which falls in 
between the average Low-Cost ($459.60) and Moderate-Cost ($569.90) plans.
136 
A family of four, meanwhile, gets $757 from the IRS; for a family with children ages 2-3 
and 4-5, this falls between the Low-Cost ($667.20) and Moderate-Cost ($823.60) plans, but for 
families with slightly older children (6-8 and 9-11) it is in between Thrifty ($603.10) and Low-
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Cost ($783.00). Taking these rules at face value, the Bankruptcy Code is telling families with 
young children that they may spend a low-to-moderate amount of food, while families with older 
children must be significantly thriftier, as defined by the government itself! 
So far, the means-test numbers may not seem particularly troubling, as they all fall within 
USDA recommendations for a healthy diet, albeit at different levels. This is not the case for the 
marginal IRS figures, however. Adding a third person to the family yields an extra $102 in 
bankruptcy. This, according to the CNPP, corresponds to a thrifty budget for children 1-5, and 
for anyone else is below the amount necessary to maintain a healthy diet.
137  
The  Bankruptcy  Code  does  not  merely  allow  these  outcomes—it  mandates  them. 
Congress could easily fix this by cross-referencing not to arbitrary IRS numbers but rather to the 
carefully-considered USDA amounts. Similarly, it could reduce inequities by choosing one of the 
CNPP plans (say, Low-Cost) and sticking to those figures throughout. The improvements in 
consistency and equity that could result from so simple an amendment are quite impressive. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
  Filing for bankruptcy is inherently a balancing act between debtors and creditors, and 
tough decisions have to be made in order to guarantee equitable monetary distributions. Nowhere 
are these decisions more personal than in determining what one is entitled to put into one’s body. 
For this reason, the treatment of food, drugs, and cigarettes is a particularly important subject, 
even if these costs are small compared to other debtor expenses. 
  The Bankruptcy Code, in order to remain fair and consistent, needs to be more careful 
about  how  it  treats  these  substances.  It  should  not  automatically  reject  expenses  for  lawful 
activities like smoking, nor should it allow all drug and health expenditures without any scrutiny 
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of cost or category. As for food, the Code needs to implement a more thoughtful system than 
merely parroting the IRS for above-median debtors and allowing judges to decide what amounts 
are excessive for below-median debtors by using arbitrary and unreviewed standards. 
  Throughout the discussion of these substances and the adverse consequences related to 
their treatment, this paper has hinted at two possible solutions. Moving forward, the Bankruptcy 
Code could decide to give courts more discretion, essentially by going back to the pre-BAPCPA 
system  in  which  judges  decided  what  expenses  were  necessary.
138  Such  an  approach,  many 
scholars argue, would allow flexible common law to replace rigid statutory numbers. Bankruptcy 
judges know best, and with the authority to ensure a fair result the system might improve.
139 
  An  alternative  is  to  reduce  judicial  discretion,  thereby  decreasing  the  chances  for 
disparate treatment of similar individuals. For example, Congress could apply the means-test 
numbers equally to everyone, removing the discretionary standards that still exist for below-
median  debtors.  Congress  could  also  link  these  numbers  to  those  determined  by  other 
government agencies (such as FDA, HHS, and USDA) that have thought more thoroughly about 
what numbers constitute appropriate expenses. 
  This paper expresses no opinion on which general approach is superior. All that is clear at 
present  is  that  the  bankruptcy  system,  especially  since  2005,  has  perpetuated  some  basic 
inequities and inconsistencies that are both symbolically troublesome and easy to address. When 
Congress next sees fit to amend the Bankruptcy Code, it should be mindful that asking debtors to 
tighten their belts without considering these basic consequences is not a reasonable solution. 
Only then can the Bankruptcy Code truly give a fair and fresh start to debtors in need. 
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